CMC Politics of Journalism: Deza

Misinformation: a photoshop joke that some took as a sinister manipulation:

Disinformation, example from Clair Wardle:

Take, for example, the edited video of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi that circulated this past May. It was a genuine video, but an agent of disinformation slowed down the video and then posted that clip to make it seem that Pelosi was slurring her words. Just as intended, some viewers immediately began speculating that Pelosi was drunk, and the video spread on social media. Then the mainstream media picked it up, which undoubtedly made many more people aware of the video than would have originally encountered it.

Deepfakes:

Malinformation -- Trump Jr. tweets name of the whistleblower

Indictment

From a recent Senate report:

The Committee found that Russia's targeting of the 2016 U.S. presidential election
was part of a broader, sophisticated, and ongoing information warfare campaign designed
to sow discord in American politics and society. Moreover, the IRA conducted a vastly
more complex and strategic assault on the United States than was initially understood.
The IR.A's actions in 2016 represent only the latest installment in an increasingly brazen
interference by the Kremlin on the citizens and democratic institutions of the United
States.

...
The Committee found that no single group of Americans was targeted by IRA
information operatives more than African-Americans. By far, race and related issues
were the preferred target of the information warfare campaign designed to divide the
country in 2016. Examples

The report also explains an important concept: "payload content"

In practice, the IRA's influence operatives dedicated the balance of their effort to establishing the credibility of their online personas, such as by posting .innocuous content designed to appeal to like-minded users. This innocuous content allowed IRAinfluence operatives to build character details for their fake personas, such as a conservative Southerner or a liberal activist, until the opportune moment arrived when the account was used to deliver tailored "payload content" designed to influence the targeted user. By this concept of operations, the volume and content of posts can obscure the actual objective behind the influence operation. "If you're running a propaganda outfit, most of what you publish is factual so that you're taken seriously," Graphika CEO and TAG researcher John Kelly described to the Commttee, "[T]hen you can slip in the wrong thing at exactly the right time."

(U) The tactic of using select payload messages among a large volume of innocuous content to attract and cultivate an online following is reflected in the posts made to the IRA's "Army of Jesus" Facebook page. The page, which had attracted over 216,000 followers by the time it was taken down by Facebook for violating the platform's terms of service, purported to be devoted to Christian themes and Bible passages. The page's content was largely consistent with this facade. The following series of posts from the "Army of Jesus" page illustrates the use of this tactic, with the majority of posts largely consistent with the page's theme, excepting the November 1, 2016 post that represents the IRA's payload content:

October 26, 2016: "There has never been a day when people did not need to walk with Jesus."

October 29, 2016: "I've got Jesus in my soul. It's the only way I know .... Watching every move I make, guiding every step I take!"

October 31, 2016: "Rise and shine-realize His blessing!"

October 31, 2016: "Jesus will always be by your side. Just reach out to Him and you'll see!"

November 1, 2016: "HILLARY APPROVES REMOVAL OF GOD FROM THE

PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE."

November 2, 2016: "Never hold on anything [sic] tighter than you holding unto God!"

Soviet Operations During the Cold War (at about 3:30)

INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND FACEBOOK

Examples of Fake Facebook posts from 2016

House Intelligence held a hearing in 2017. From the committee minority staff:

Russia exploited real vulnerabilities that exist across online platforms and we must identify, expose, and defend ourselves against similar covert influence operations in the future. The companies here today must play a central role as we seek to better protect legitimate political expression, while preventing cyberspace from being misused by our adversaries.